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Negative Externalities and Equilibrium Existence in 
Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection
*
 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in 
markets with adverse selection. Building on their framework we demonstrate that externalities 
between agents − an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends on the average type 
attracted by the respective principal − can solve the equilibrium existence problem, even 
when the size of the externalities is arbitrarily small. Our result highlights the degree of 
control a principal has over the attractiveness of his contracts as an important feature for 
equilibrium existence, thereby offering a new perspective on existing theories of competition 
in markets with adverse selection. 
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In their seminal contribution to the economics of imperfect information, Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) show that there need not exist a competitive equilibrium in markets with
adverse selection. We introduce a simple externality between agents into their framework
and show that this externality can solve the equilibrium existence problem. In our model, an
agent's utility upon accepting a contract does not only depend on his type and the contract,
but also on the average type of agents attracted by the respective principal. We prove that
such externality can ensure the existence of equilibrium even if the externality is arbitrarily
small. Further, any competitive equilibrium is a Pareto-dominant separating equilibrium. Al-
though externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, they thus do not blunt model predictions.
To illustrate, consider a screening version of Spence's (1973) labor market model. Suppose
¯rms compete for workers by o®ering employment contracts. Employment contracts specify
education levels which make an employee eligible for particular wages. Workers have private
information on their productivity. As high-productivity workers have lower costs of acquiring
education than low-productivity workers, ¯rms can separate workers by appropriately com-
bining education levels and wages. Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) show that in a competitive
equilibrium all ¯rms make zero pro¯ts, low-productivity workers acquire no education, and
high-productivity workers acquire the minimum education needed to ensure separation from
low-productivity workers. The resulting screening costs do not depend on the fraction of
low-productivity workers, and are borne by the high-productivity workers. Now suppose a
¯rm enters the market with a pooling contract that requires no education and sets wages
so as to make some small pro¯t when accepted by all workers. This contract becomes more
and more attractive as the fraction of low-productivity workers decreases, and it converges to
the best possible contract that can be o®ered to high-productivity workers without making
losses as the fraction of low-productivity workers and the o®ering ¯rm's pro¯ts go to zero.
If the fraction of low-productivity workers is su±ciently small, such a pooling contract thus
attracts all workers and makes positive pro¯ts. There then exists no competitive equilibrium.
Now suppose that there are externalities. To makes things concrete, suppose that after a
worker has joined some ¯rm he is matched into a team with another employee of the same
¯rm. The two workers are promised a bonus if the team succeeds to meet a performance
target. Like in Kremer (1993) production consists of many tasks, all of which must be well ex-
2ecuted for the team to be successful.1 High-productivity workers can do the job, whereas the
presence of at least one low-productivity worker causes the team to fail. High-productivity
workers then dislike being matched with a low-productivity colleague. Low-productivity
workers, on the other hand, do not care for their colleague's productivity as their own pres-
ence is already su±cient to ensure that they never get the team bonus. A high-productivity
worker's utility upon accepting the o®ered employment contract thus depends on the fraction
of low-productivity workers employed by the same ¯rm. For low-productivity workers this is
not the case.
The externality between agents entails that there exist equilibrium acceptance choices in
which a ¯rm o®ering a pooling contract is not able to attract any high-productivity workers.
Given that none of the other high-productivity workers accepts the contract, each high-
productivity worker ¯nds it optimal not to accept the contract as he would be matched with
a low-productivity colleague for sure, which he dislikes. As the pooling contract makes losses
when attracting only low-productivity workers, market entry is unpro¯table. Hence, a com-
petitive equilibrium exists. Our main result shows that the externality does not have to be
large in order to ensure equilibrium existence. In fact, it can become arbitrarily small. The
reason is that ¯rms can o®er what we call \preemptive contracts." These contracts, which in
equilibrium will be o®ered by ¯rms drawing only low-productivity workers, are not accepted
by any workers in equilibrium. However, following the market entry of a new ¯rm attracting
only low-productivity workers, they suddenly become appealing to high-productivity work-
ers. We show that the maximum utility a high-productivity worker can get by accepting a
preemptive contract after market entry can be unbounded even if the externality is arbitrarily
small. Therefore, equilibrium existence is guaranteed.
Our analysis o®ers a new perspective on existing theories of competition in markets with
adverse selection. Extending Rothschild and Stiglitz's original equilibrium concept Wilson
(1977) and Riley (1979) allow principals to react to market entry. While this solves the equi-
librium existence problem, equilibrium characteristics depend on whether principals can add
or withdraw contracts after market entry. As argued by Hellwig (1987) explicitly modeling
1Kremer (1993) motivates such strongly complementary production functions by referring to the \space
shuttle Challenger which had thousands of components: it exploded because it was launched at a temperature
that caused one of those components, the O-rings, to malfunction." (p. 551) Further examples of O-ring
production functions are discussed in Dalmazzo (2002), Fabel (2004), and Jones (2008).
3the principals' strategic interaction generates interesting insights and solves the equilibrium
existence problem; however, equilibrium predictions remain \very sensitive to the details of
the game-theoretic speci¯cation" (p.320).2 Gale (1992) and Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002)
depart from what the latter criticize as the \hybrid oligopolistic-competitive story" and take
a Walrasian approach. In the Walrasian approach, market participants do not act strategi-
cally but consider the other parties' behavior as una®ected by their own actions. Contracts
are traded like consumption commodities, and the attractiveness - so to speak the price - of
a contract is determined by the forces of supply and demand rather than by the decision of
principals. These assumptions guarantee equilibrium existence. Adverse selection arises in
such a setting if the attractiveness of a contract depends on the types of the market partici-
pants who accept this contract.
In a sense, the externality we study in our paper is of exactly the same kind as in the Walrasian
approach. However, while in a Walrasian market the externality is inextricably connected
to the existence of adverse selection, we can vary the strength of the externality keeping the
original adverse selection problem ¯xed. This allows us to isolate the impact of the external-
ity on equilibrium existence from the e®ect of changing the equilibrium concept. In fact, we
derive su±cient and necessary conditions on the externality ensuring equilibrium existence
in the original Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) setup. Our study thereby highlights a central
feature of the Walrasian approach being of key importance for the existence of equilibrium:
the degree of control a principal has over the attractiveness of his o®ered contracts.3 In a
Rothschild-Stiglitz setup, an agent's utility upon accepting a contract depends exclusively on
the contract terms and the agent's type. This gives a principal full control over the attrac-
tiveness of a contract for a particular type of agent. Market entry is possible as principals
can make sure that all types of agents ¯nd it optimal to accept the new pooling contract. In
contrast, in a Walrasian setup demand and supply rather than principals determine a con-
tract's attractiveness. This restrains market entry and facilitates equilibrium existence. In
our model, principals can at least partly commit to and thus control certain contract terms,
i.e., a contract's attractiveness is not primarily determined by market forces. However, due
to the externality one important aspect a®ecting the attractiveness of a contract lies beyond
a principal's control: the distribution of agents across contracts. Similar to the Walrasian
model this lack of control ensures equilibrium existence. In contrast to the Walrasian model
2See also Bester (1985) and Cho and Kreps (1987).
3See also the discussion in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), pp. 1549-1550.
4lack of control in our model can become arbitrarily small without eliminating the adverse
selection problem.
2 Model
2.1 Principals, Agents, and Contracts
There is a countably in¯nite number of principals facing a continuum of agents with total
mass normalized to one. Let n 2 IN be the identity of a principal. Let £ = f`;hg 2 IR2 be
the agents' type space with h > `. Types are private information and independent, where
initially each agent is of type h with probability ¹0 2]0;1[.
Principals can enter the market at zero costs by o®ering the agents countable - possibly in-
¯nite - sets of contracts. A contract c = (q;t;n) describes a decision q 2 IR+ that is costly
to the agent and a transfer t 2 IR that yields the agent some bene¯ts upon acceptance. It
includes the principal's identity n 2 IN. Principals can determine transfers and decisions but
their identity is ¯xed. Let C = IR+ £IR£IN denote the contract space. Let Cn denote some
set of contracts o®ered by principal n and let C =
S
n2IN Cn describe the total set of o®ered
contracts.
Our paper extends the existing literature by assuming that an agent's utility upon accepting
a contract can directly depend on the acceptance choices of the other agents. We assume
that principals and agents do not have preferences over principals' identities as such. Identi-
ties are only required since agents need not be indi®erent between two contracts specifying
the same transfers and decisions as soon as principals attract di®erent average types of agents.
Let the function u : £ £ [`;h] £ IR+ £ IR ! IR describe agents' preferences where u(µ;y;q;t)
characterizes the utility of an agent of type µ who accepts contract c = (q;t;n) if principal n
attracts agents of average type y. Function u is at least twice partially di®erentiable in y,
q, and t. We assume that uq < 0, ut > 0, uqt = 0, uqq ¸ 0, and utt · 0. Further, function
u(µ;y;q;¢) is unbounded above for all (µ;y;q) while u(µ;y;¢;t) is unbounded below for all
(µ;y;t). Externalities among agents are formalized as follows.
De¯nition 1 (Externality: Agents). We assume that uy > 0 for y < µ and uy = 0 for y ¸ µ.
An agent's utility upon accepting a contract o®ered by some principal is increasing in the
average type of agents attracted by the same principal, as long as this average type is lower
5than the agent's type. If an agent's type is weakly lower than the average type, he no longer
experiences a negative externality. A low type's utility upon accepting a contract thus does
not depend on the average type of agent attracted by the same principal.
To illustrate we repeatedly refer to our labor-market example from the introduction.
Example (cont'd): Consider the example discussed in the introduction. Firms o®er con-
tracts that specify a required education level q and a base wage t. Part of the compensation
package is also a team bonus ° t with ° > 0 which is exogenously ¯xed to the base salary.4
This team bonus is paid if the team is successful. By the O-ring production technology the
team is successful if and only if both team members are highly productive. Let b(y) be the
probability of being matched with a high-productivity worker if y is the average type of work-
ers employed by ¯rm n. We must have b(`) = 0 and b(h) = 1. In principle, the ¯rm might
use some internal mechanisms to a®ect worker matching, but our results hold as long as
complete separation is impossible and b is increasing in y. Then a worker's expected utility





t ¡ q=` if µ = `
t ¡ q=h + b(y)° t if µ = h
(1)
where q=µ are the usual type-speci¯c costs of acquiring education.
We often refer to agents' preferences over decisions and transfers given that they are pooled
with some ¯xed average type of agents. De¯ne an agent's indi®erence curve ¹ Uµ(y) in (q;t)-
space as the set of all combinations of decisions and transfers which - if o®ered by a principal
attracting agents of average type y - yield an agent of type µ constant utility. Formally, this
indi®erence curve is de¯ned as
¹ Uµ(y) = f(q;t) 2 IR+ £ IR : u(µ;y ;q;t) ´ ¹ u; ¹ u 2 IRg: (2)
Indi®erence curves have slope ¡uq(µ;y;q;t)=ut(µ;y;q;t), which does not depend on the av-
erage attracted type for low types, but might depend on the average type for high types.
We assume that the slope of agents' indi®erence curves is decreasing in µ for all y. This is
our version of the Spence-Mirrlees or single-crossing property. Requiring it to hold for all
4Thus, ¯rms cannot use the team bonus as an additional instrument to screen workers. In Kosfeld and
von Siemens (forthcoming), we analyze a particular application and show that this assumption can be relaxed
without a®ecting our results concerning equilibrium existence.
6y imposes a restriction: Changing the average attracted type must not a®ect the slope of
the indi®erence curves of high types so as to upset the single-crossing property. Finally, we
assume that the average attracted type y has a monotone in°uence on the slope of high-type
agents' indi®erence curves: @
@yf¡uq(h;y;q;t)=ut(h;y;q;t)g is either always weakly positive
or always strictly negative. We normalize an agent's utility to zero in case he accepts no
contract. We also assume that u(µ;µ;0;0) = 0 for all µ. If an agent is pooled with agents of
his type and accepts a contract that speci¯es zero decision and zero transfer, he thus gets a
utility equal to his outside option.
Our results are entirely driven by the externality among agents, so that principals' utility
functions could be de¯ned as usual. Yet, we show that including analogous externalities in the
principals' utility function causes no problems. Let the function v : ££[`;h]£IR+£IR ! IR
describe principals' preferences, where v(µ;y;q;t) is principal n's utility per agent of type µ
accepting contract c = (q;t;n) if he attracts agents of average type y. Function v is at least
once partially di®erentiable in q and t with vt < 0 and vq = 0. We focus on adverse selection
and the associated costs of separation and thus assume that the decision is non-productive.5
Function v(µ;y;q;¢) is unbounded below for all (µ;y;t). Principals prefer high types so that
v(h;y;q;t) > v(`;y;q;t) for all (y;q;t).
De¯nition 2 (Externality: Principals). We assume that vy ¸ 0 for y < µ and vy = 0 for
y ¸ µ.
The presence of low types might reduce the principal's utility per attracted agent of high type,
but as the de¯nition shows this externality can also be zero without a®ecting our results. Let
´(µ;c;C) be the mass of agents of type µ accepting contract c if set C of contracts is o®ered.






Principals get an outside option utility of zero if they do not attract any agents. We assume
that v(µ;`;0;0) > 0 for all µ and y. A principal thus gets more than his outside option if
he can attract agents with a contract that speci¯es a zero transfer. Together with the as-
sumption on agents' outside option, this ensures that mutually bene¯cial contracting between
5In our labor market example the decision is education which - as in Spence (1973) - does not a®ect the
worker's productivity. In case the decision is productive, ¯rst-best decisions might ensure separation so that
there is no problem of adverse selection.
7principals and agents is possible.
Example (cont'd): The pro¯t of a ¯rm that employs a worker of type µ and promises base
wage t is µ ¡ t if the workers team is not successful, and (1 + °)µ ¡ (1 + °)t if the team is
successful. We can vary the importance of our externality by varying °, and we can do so
without simultaneously a®ecting the problem of adverse selection in the labor market. If ° is
zero we get a simple screening version of Spence's job signalling model.
We focus on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria where all agents share the same
type-dependent acceptance decisions and principals do not mix over their sets of o®ered
contracts. Let P(C) be the power set of contract space C. Since we only consider symmetric
equilibria we suppress indexation for an agent's identity in the following. An agent's com-
pletely speci¯ed strategy is an acceptance rule a : ££C£P(C) ! [0;1] where a(µ;c;C) 2 [0;1]
is the probability with which he accepts contract c 2 C if he is of type µ. An acceptance rule
can only assign a positive acceptance probability to contracts that are o®ered. For all C 2 C
and µ 2 £, a(µ;c;C) = 0 whenever c 62 C.







be the total mass of agents attracted by principal n if he o®ers contracts Cn µ C. Unless










If A(n;C) equals zero, y(n;C) is not pinned down by the agents' acceptance decisions. In
our setting this does not cause any problems: If an agent accepts a contract o®ered by some
principal who attracts no other agents, his type determines the average type of agents at-
tracted by the principal.6 As a single agent has mass zero he cannot in°uence the average
agent attracted by a principal as soon as this principal draws a positive mass of agents.
In the presences of externalities an agent's utility might depend on the acceptance decisions of
the other agents. We account for this as follows in our de¯nition of equilibrium. Extending
6In contrast to a Walrasian approach (cf. introduction), we thus have no problems concerning the speci¯-
cation of out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
8the notion of a competitive equilibrium from Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) we de¯ne an
equilibrium as an equilibrium set of o®ered contracts plus agents' equilibrium acceptance
rules. An equilibrium set C¤ of o®ered contracts must satisfy two conditions. First, each
principal gets at least zero utility in equilibrium.7 Second, no principal ~ n can enter the
market with a menu of contracts C~ n that can attract a strictly positive mass of agents while
yielding positive overall utility. Perfect competition is thus formalized via a no-market-entry
condition. Concerning the agents we require their equilibrium acceptance decisions a¤ to form
a Bayesian equilibrium for all sets C µ C of o®ered contracts: Acceptance decisions maximize
the agent's utility given the distribution ´¤ of agents across principals, and this distribution is
consistent with the distribution of agents' types and their corresponding acceptance decisions.
2.2 Further De¯nitions and a Re¯nement
One of our main results is that there must be separation in any competitive equilibrium.
Since principals' identities as such are irrelevant, the model is silent on which principal o®ers
which contract in equilibrium. However, agents' and principals' utility functions uniquely
pin down the decisions and transfers of contracts that are accepted by high and low types.
These contracts include transfers (t`;th) and decision qh that are implicitly de¯ned by
v(`;y ;0;t`) = 0 (5)
v(h;h;qh;th) = 0 (6)
u(`;y;qh;th) = u(`;y;0;t`): (7)
As a low type's utility does not depend on the average attracted type, the choice of y in (5)
and (7) is irrelevant. We show in the Appendix that our assumptions on v and u guarantee
the existence of a unique, ¯nite, and strictly positive solution to (5) to (7) with th > t`. We
can de¯ne the sets of contracts
C` = f(q;t;n) 2 C : q = 0 and t = t` g (8)
Ch = f(q;t;n) 2 C : q = qh and t = thg (9)
with generic elements c` 2 C` and ch 2 Ch.
De¯nition 3 (Best Separating Equilibrium). In a best separating equilibrium principals o®er
contracts from both sets C` and Ch. Moreover, the following properties hold:
7We thus allow for cross-subsidization since principals can o®er several contracts. However, the possibility
for cross-subsidization does not drive any of our results.
91. All agents accept some contracts. Agents of type ` only accept contracts from C` while
agents of type h only accept contracts from Ch.
2. Agents separate across principals according to their type. There are no contracts fc;~ cg µ
C¤
n o®ered by some principal n with a¤(h;c;C¤) > 0 and a¤(`;~ c;C¤) > 0.
Due to externalities there can be multiple equilibria at the acceptance stage. The following
re¯nement rules out competitive equilibria that exist only because agents re-coordinate on
acceptance decisions once otherwise irrelevant new contracts are o®ered.
Re¯nement (No Switch). Consider an equilibrium set C¤ of o®ered contracts. Suppose a
new principal ~ n enters the market with a set of contracts C~ n that cannot attract any agents so
that a¤(µ;c;C¤ [ C~ n) = 0 for all µ 2 £, c 2 C~ n. Then agents must keep their old acceptance
decisions, a¤(µ;c;C¤ [ C~ n) = a¤(µ;c;C¤) for all c 2 C¤.
3 Results
3.1 Existence of Best Separating Equilibria (Large Externality)
Before we come to our main result (Proposition 1), we ¯rst derive conditions for the existence
of a best separating equilibrium if principals do not o®er contracts that are not accepted in
equilibrium. In this case, the following lemma shows that the utility loss of high types from
being pooled with only low types must exceed the minimum screening costs high types have
to incur in order to ensure separation in equilibrium. The lemma prepares the ground for
our main result on arbitrarily small externalities. All proofs can be found in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Best Separating Equilibrium - Large Externality). There exists a best separating
equilibrium for all ¹0 2 (0;1) in which principals o®er only contracts in C` [ Ch if and only
if u(h;h;qh;th) ¸ u(h;`;0;th).
Contrary to the situation without externalities, market entry with a pooling contract need
not be pro¯table even if the fraction of agents of the low type is arbitrarily small. Indeed, in
one equilibrium at the acceptance stage all agents optimally accept the new pooling contract.
But in another equilibrium the high types do not to accept the new contract because the
new principal only attracts low types. Since the new principal would then make losses, he
does not enter the market. Note that this result is not driven by some arbitrary speci¯cation
of out-of-equilibrium beliefs. If a new principal does enter the market, he does attract all
low types so that these agents' acceptance decisions pin down the average attracted type.
10Instead, it is the multiplicity of Bayesian equilibria at the acceptance stage which solves the
equilibrium existence problem.
Example (cont'd): In our example the best separating contracts specify t` = ` for low-
productivity workers, and th = h and qh = `(h ¡ `) for high-productivity workers. These






Choosing their separating contract high-productivity workers can secure themselves the bonus
° t, but they incur screening costs qh=h = `(h ¡ `)=h. By accepting the pooling contract they
save the screening costs, but as they are matched with low-productivity workers they loose
the bonus. If the relation ° of bonus to base salary - which in our example corresponds to
a measure of the externality among agents - is su±ciently large, there always exists a best
separating equilibrium. As shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) this condition cannot be
ful¯lled if the externality ° disappears.
3.2 Existence of Best Separating Equilibria (Arbitrarily Small Externality)
Lemma 1 describes conditions for the existence of a best separating equilibrium in which
principals do not o®er any contracts that are not in C` or Ch. We now demonstrate that an
arbitrarily small externality is su±cient to guarantee equilibrium existence if principals can
o®er contracts that are never accepted in equilibrium. The sole purpose of these preemptive
contracts is to prevent market entry.
The argument runs as follows. Consider a principal who attracts only low types in equilib-
rium. Suppose this principal also o®ers some contract that would be very attractive for high
types if he attracted only high types - but in equilibrium this contract is not accepted as the
principal only attracts low types. Now if a principal enters the market and draws all low
types, the old principal o®ering the preemptive contract attracts no agents any more. He
thus suddenly becomes very attractive for high types. However, if the new principal cannot
draw any high types, he gets negative utility and there is no market entry.8
8The argument resembles the line of reasoning in Riley (1979) who allows ¯rms to o®er new contracts and
thereby to skim o® the good types after market entry. In our model such contracts are already o®ered in
equilibrium.
11To analyze preemptive contracts, let ¡ be the set of all combinations of transfers and decisions
that do not attract any high types if o®ered by a principal who currently attracts only low
types. ¡ contains all (q;t) that satisfy
u(`;y;q`;t`) ¸ u(`;y;q;t) (11)
u(h;h;qh;th) ¸ u(h;`;q;t): (12)
As a low type's utility does not depend on the average attracted type, the choice of y in
(11) is irrelevant. Because preemptive contracts do not attract any agents in equilibrium,








as the supremum of the utility which high types can get if they accept a preemptive contract
which is o®ered by a principal who - after market entry - attracts no agents. There is the
following result.
Lemma 2 (Supremum Utility Preemptive Contracts). Consider the supremum utility Up
that high-type agents can get by accepting a preemptive contract after market entry.
1. If @
@yf¡uq(h;y;q;t)=ut(h;y;q;t)g ¸ 0 then Up = u(h;h;qp;tp), where (qp;tp) is implic-
itly de¯ned by u(`;y;0;t`) = u(`;y;qp;tp) and u(h;h;qh;th) = u(h;`;qp;tp).
2. If @
@yf¡uq(h;y;q;t)=ut(h;y;q;t)g < 0 then Up = +1.
Figure 1 illustrates Lemma 2. Set ¡ is the area under the two indi®erence curves ¹ U`(y) and
¹ Uh(`) for some y (since the average attracted type is irrelevant for low types). If increasing the
average attracted type does not °atten the indi®erence curves of high types, the supremum
utility Up is ¯nite and is attainable by accepting a preemptive contract with decision and
transfer (qp;tp). But if increasing y °attens the indi®erence curves of high types, moving
up along ¹ Uh(`) increases the high types' utility without violating any constraint. Figure 1
shows that in this case Up equals plus in¯nity. It is now possible to characterize su±cient
and necessary conditions for the existence of a best separating equilibrium.
Proposition 1 (Best Separating Equilibrium - Arbitrarily Small Externality).
1. There exists a best separating equilibrium for all ¹0 2 (0;1) if and only if
Up ¸ u(h;`;0;th).
2. If @
@yf¡uq(h;y;q;t)=ut(h;y;q;t)g < 0 then Up = +1 even if externalities are arbitrarily
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Figure 1: Set ¡ is the shaded area.
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 imply that arbitrarily small externalities can ensure equilibrium
existence. In the following we show with the help of our example that the required °attening
of the high types' indi®erence curves is well plausible.
Example (cont'd): In our example a high-productivity worker is indi®erent to - and thus
optimally rejects - any preemptive contract that speci¯es for education level ~ q a base salary
~ t = t + ~ q=h where
t = h(1 + °) ¡
1
µ
`(h ¡ `): (14)
Among these contracts we look for a preemptive contract that satis¯es two conditions. First,
the preemptive contract is not accepted by low-productivity workers. Using these workers'











Second, the preemptive contract must attract all high-productivity workers in case there is mar-
ket entry. If the pooling contract only attracts low-productivity workers, a high-productivity
worker who joins the new ¯rm never gets the bonus and thus does not earn more than utility











Market entry can thus be prevented by a preemptive contract that speci¯es an educational
level su±ciently large so as to satisfy both (15) and (16). Such a contract can be easily found
13for any level of externality °, thus an arbitrarily small externality is su±cient to guarantee
equilibrium existence.
3.3 Description of Equilibrium Outcome
So far we have focused on the su±cient and necessary conditions under which externalities
ensure the existence of a best separating equilibrium. We now proceed to show that when-
ever there exists a competitive equilibrium in pure strategies, it must be a best separating
equilibrium. The main step is to show that there cannot be pooling in equilibrium.
Lemma 3 (No Pooling). In any competitive equilibrium there are no contracts fc;^ cg µ C¤
n
o®ered by some principal n with a¤(`;c;C¤) > 0 and a¤(h;^ c;C¤) > 0.
Adapting the arguments by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) it is now easy to show that any
competitive equilibrium must be a best separating equilibrium. Since only low types exert
an externality on high types, low types behave as if there were no externalities at all. In any
competitive equilibrium they must thus get their contracts from set C`. If high types do not
get their contracts from Ch, then a new principal can enter the market and o®er a contract
that brings these agents closer to the best separating equilibrium. This contract is designed
so as to never attract low types. High types can then be certain that they will be either
alone or among themselves whenever they accept the new contract. A strictly positive mass
of high types is thus attracted while low types stick to their old contract choices. The new
contract then yields the principal strictly positive utility, and there is market entry.
Proposition 2 (Description and Existence of Competitive Equilibrium).
1. Any competitive equilibrium is a best separating equilibrium.
2. A competitive equilibrium exists if and only if Up ¸ u(h;`;0;th).
As in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) any competitive equilibrium is characterized by Pareto-
dominant separation. Although externalities facilitate equilibrium existence, they do not
a®ect equilibrium predictions. Moreover, su±cient and necessary conditions for the existence
of a best separating equilibrium are su±cient and necessary conditions for the existence of
any competitive equilibrium.
4 Discussion
In this paper we show that particular negative externalities among agents can mitigate the
equilibrium existence problem in competitive markets with adverse selection. Already in a
14standard adverse selection setting there are externalities among agents: In the labor market
example the presence of workers with low-productivity prevents ¯rms from o®ering high wages
to workers of high-productivity without requiring them to acquire some minimum education
that ensures separation. The externalities we have in mind are more direct as they arise once
agents contract with the same principal. It is crucial that these externalities lie beyond the
control of principals: Suppose a principal can credibly guarantee to protect high types from
low types - for example by structural means that separate types within the organization, or
by committing to precisely speci¯ed contractual terms. Since this makes pooling contracts
attractive again, there is market entry and the equilibrium existence problem continues to
exist. However, it is not obvious whether principals can in fact credibly commit to eliminate
externalities among their agents. For example, having separate plants for workers of di®erent
productivity might be prohibitively expensive or impossible given the production technology.
Our model does not consider positive externalities, where low types want to be pooled with
hight types but high types do not care about the presence of low types. This could have the
following consequences. Since positive externalities do not a®ect the high types' acceptance
decisions, they do not in°uence the attractiveness of a pooling contract for high types. The
latter determines the stability of a best separating equilibrium, thus weak externalities have
no e®ect on the conditions for equilibrium existence. However, low types now want to be
pooled with high types. If externalities are strong, it might thus no longer be possible to
skim o® high types from a pooling contract since low types always follow. Strong positive
externalities might thus render the existence of pooling equilibria possible. Beyond the scope
of the present paper, a complete characterization of the consequences of positive and negative
externalities in competitive markets with adverse selection thus remains a fruitful topic for
further research.
Appendix (Proofs)
De¯nition of a Best Separating Equilibrium
v(`;y;0;0) > 0 and v(`;y;0;¢) is unbounded below. Then vt < 0, continuity of v, and the
intermediate value theorem imply that there exists a unique, ¯nite, and strictly positive t`
satisfying (5). By the same argument there exists a unique, ¯nite, and strictly positive th
satisfying (6) where vq = 0 implies that th does not depend on qh.
15v(h;y;q;t) > v(`;y;q;t) for all (y;q;t). Then v(h;h;qh;t`) > v(`;h;qh;t`) = 0 where the
last equality follows from vq = 0 and vy(`;y;q;t) = 0 for all (y;q;t). This yields th > t` so
that u(`;y;0;th) > u(`;y;0;t`) since ut > 0. Function u(`;y;¢;th) is unbounded below. Then
uq < 0, continuity of u, and the intermediate value theorem imply the existence of a unique,
¯nite, and strictly positive qh satisfying (7).
Proof of Lemma 1
We ¯rst show that agents get more than their outside option in a best separating equilibrium.
This holds directly for low types since t` > 0, ut > 0, and u(`;y;0;0) = 0 for all y. By
de¯nition u(`;h;qh;th) = u(`;h;0;t`). This yields u(h;h;qh;th) > u(h;h;0;t`) because qh > 0
and the single crossing property holds for all y. However, u(h;h;0;t`) > 0 follows from t` > 0,
ut > 0, and u(h;h;0;0) = 0. In equilibrium high types thus get more than their outside
option. We next show our main result.
Part 1: Su±ciency
Consider a best separating equilibrium in which principals only o®er contracts in C` [ Ch.
By de¯nition this equilibrium cannot be upset by a principal who enters the market and then
attracts only one type of agents.
Suppose principal ~ n enters the market with contracts ~ c` = (~ q`;~ t`; ~ n) and ~ ch = (~ qh;~ th; ~ n) for
type ` and h. As otherwise type ` optimally rejects, uy(`;y;q;t) = 0 and uq < 0 imply ~ t` > t`.
Because they do not care for the average attracted type, type `'s acceptance decisions do not
depend on the behavior of type h. If a¤(`;~ c`;C¤ [ C~ n) must be strictly positive in one, then
~ n attracts all type ` in any equilibrium at the acceptance stage.
vy(`;y;q;t) = 0, vq = 0, and ~ t` > t` imply v(`;y; ~ q`;~ t`) < 0. Principal ~ n makes losses unless
he can attract h. The proof proceeds to show that for every equilibrium at the acceptance
stage with a¤(h;~ ch;C¤ [ C~ n) > 0 in which the principal breaks even, there exists another
equilibrium with a¤(h;~ ch;C¤ [ C~ n) = 0. Given these acceptance decisions principal ~ n makes
losses and thus does not enter the market.
Suppose a¤(h;~ ch;C¤ [C~ n) > 0 and principal ~ n makes no losses: if y~ n is his average attracted
type, v(h;y~ n; ~ qh;~ th) > 0 holds. With vt < 0, ut > 0, uq < 0, and vq = 0, this implies that
type h who accept ~ ch cannot get more than u(h;y~ n;0;~ th) where ~ th solves v(h;y~ n;0;~ th) = 0.
16Take th from De¯nition 3. Decisions are not productive so that vy(h;y;q;t) · 0 and y~ n · h
imply th ¸ ~ th. Then a¤(`;~ c`;C¤ [ C~ n) = 1 and a¤(h;~ ch;C¤ [ C~ n) = 0 with y~ n = ` form an
equilibrium at the acceptance stage. Type ` act optimally by the above arguments. Further,
type h who accept ~ ch get less than u(h;`;0;~ th) and thus less than u(h;`;0;th). They get
u(h;h;qh;th) by accepting c 2 Ch. As u(h;h;qh;th) ¸ u(h;`;0;th) they choose ch.
Part 2: Necessity
Take a best separating equilibrium and consider a sequence f¹kgk2IN of prior probabilities
with ¹k < 1 for all k 2 IN but limk!1 ¹k = 1. De¯ne yk = `+¹k(h¡`) and ²k = 1=k. Given
¹k suppose a principal n enters the market with a pooling contract ck = (0;tk¡²k;n) where tk
is implicitly de¯ned by ¹k v(h;yk;0;tk)+(1¡¹k)v(`;yk;0;tk) = 0. He thus gets strictly posi-
tive utility if he can attract all agents. Then vq = 0 and continuity of v imply limk!1 tk = th.
If u(h;h;qh;th) < u(h;`;0;th) then continuity of u implies that there exists a K 2 IN so that
for all k ¸ K we have u(h;`;0;tk) > u(h;h;qh;th). In the following take some ¹k with k ¸ K.
Given prior probability ¹k and market entry by principal n, type ` accept ck since tk > t`.
As u(h;`;0;tk) > u(h;h;qh;th) type h prefer ck to any ch 2 Ch even if y(n;C¤ [ ck) = `.
The single-crossing property and qh > 0 imply that high types prefer contract ch 2 Ch
to any contract c` 2 C` even if the principal who o®ers c` does not attracting any low
types. Only contracts in C` [ Ch are o®ered. Transitivity implies a¤(h;ck;C¤ [ ck) = 1 and
a¤(`;ck;C¤ [ ck) = 1 in any equilibrium at the acceptance stage. As he thereby gets strictly
positive utility, principal n enters the market. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
¡ is the area under indi®erence curves ¹ U`(y) and ¹ Uh(`) which correspond to utility levels
u(`;y;q`;t`) and u(h;h;qh;th). By de¯nition ¹ U`(y) contains (0;t`) and (qh;th) since (7) does
not depend on the particular y. Take an indi®erence curve ¹ U0
h(`) which corresponds to utility
level u(h;`;qh;th) and thus contains (qh;th). By the single-crossing property ¹ U0
h(`) is °at-
ter than ¹ U`(y) and thus runs above ¹ U`(y) to the left of (qh;th). It intersects the t-axis at
~ t > t` where ~ t solves u(h;`;0;~ t) = u(h;`;qh;th). ¹ Uh(`) which corresponds to utility level
u(h;h;qh;th) > u(h;`;qh;th) runs above ¹ U0
h(`). Set ¡ is thus as illustrated in Figure 1.
We look for the supremum Up as de¯ned in (13). First, take any (q;t) so that both (11)
and (12) are slack. Then one can increase the transfer t without violating any constraint so
17that Up > u(h;h;q;t) for such (q;t). Second, take any (q;t) so that (11) is binding while
(12) is slack. Consider marginal changes dt;dq > 0 with dt=dq = ¡uq(`;y;q;t)=ut(`;y;q;t).
This keeps (11) satis¯ed while the single-crossing property implies that (12) remains satis¯ed
and u(h;h;q + dq;t + dt) > u(h;h;q;t). Thus, Up > u(h;h;q;t) for such (q;t). Third, take
the (qp;tp) so that by de¯nition both (11) and (12) are binding. Consider marginal changes
dt;dq > 0 with dt=dq = ¡uq(h;`;qp;tp)=(ut(h;`;qp;tp). This keeps (12) satis¯ed while slack-
ening (11) by the single-crossing property. There are then two cases.
First, suppose @
@yf¡uq=utg ¸ 0. Then u(h;h;qp;tp) ¸ u(h;h;qp+dq;tp+dt) so that contracts
with (qp;tp) provide type h with the maximum utility Up = u(h;h;qp;tp). Second, suppose
@
@yf¡uq=utg < 0. Then u(h;h;qp;tp) < u(h;h;qp + dq;tp + dt). Because one can ¯nd similar
contract adjustments for all (q;t) such that (11) is slack while (12) is binding, there exists
an in¯nite sequence f(qk;tk)gk2IN where limk!1 u(h;h;qk;tk) = +1 and (qk;tk) 2 ¡ for all
k 2 IN. In this case we have Up = +1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider a best separating equilibrium in which principal n o®ers a contract c` 2 C` that
attracts type `. Suppose n also o®ers a contract cn 62 C` [ Ch while cn 2 ¡. This contract
cn = (qn;tn;n) is not accepted in equilibrium, but it changes the conditions under which a
newly o®ered contract ~ ch can attract type h. Contract ~ ch need not draw type h if and only
if they have a better option in C¤. Type h who accept cn can now get u(h;h;qn;tn) once n
no longer attracts any type `. There exists cn 2 ¡ so that they reject ~ ch for all ¹0 2 (0;1) if
and only if Up ¸ u(h;`;th;0; ~ n). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3
Consider a competitive equilibrium in which principal n o®ers one or several contracts and
attracts all types of agents. Let y¤(n;C¤) 2 (`;h) be the average type of agent he attracts in
equilibrium. The proof proceeds in two steps.
Part 1: Strictly Positive Utility with Low Types
Let c = (q;t;n) be a contract o®ered by n that attracts ` while v(`;y ;q;t) > 0. Suppose a
new principal ~ n enters the market with contract ~ c = (q;t + ²; ~ n) with ² > 0. Then ut > 0
and uy = 0 for type ` imply u(`; ~ y;q;t + ²) > u(`;y;q;t) for any ~ y and y. Consequently,
a¤(`;~ c;C¤ [ ~ c) = 1 and contract ~ c can attract at least all type ` in any equilibrium at the
18acceptance stage. Furthermore, vy(`;y;q;t) = 0 and v(`;y ;q;t) > 0 imply v(`;`;q;t + ²) > 0
for small ². Finally, v(h;y;q;t+²) > v(`;y;q;t+²) for all y so that ~ c always yields principal
~ n strictly positive utility no matter what agents are attracted. As ~ c attracts at least agents
of type ` the original situation cannot form an equilibrium.
Part 2: Weakly Negative Utility with Low Types
Now suppose there is no c 2 C¤
n that attracts ` and v(`;y¤(n;C¤);q;t) > 0. As principal n
otherwise gets strictly negative utility in equilibrium, there must exist ^ c = (^ q;^ t;n) 2 C¤
n that
attracts h and v(h;y¤(n;C¤); ^ q;^ t) ¸ 0. Suppose a new principal ~ n enters the market and
o®ers contract ~ c = (^ q;^ t ¡ ²; ~ n) with ² > 0.
Together with the optimality of the original contract choice, ut > 0 and uy(`;y;q;t) = 0
imply u(`;y ;q;t) ¸ u(`;y; ^ q;^ t) > u(`; ~ y; ^ q;^ t ¡ ²) for any y and ~ y. Then a¤(`;~ c;C¤ [ ~ c) = 0 so
that ~ c never attracts type ` in any equilibrium at the acceptance stage. Because we restrict
attention to symmetric acceptance decisions, there are two cases.
First, suppose ~ c attracts nobody. Then Re¯nement (No Switch) requires a¤(µ;c;C¤ [ ~ c) =
a¤(µ;c;C¤) for all µ 2 £, c 2 C¤. Type h get utility u(h;y¤(n;C¤); ^ q;^ t) in equilibrium. Then
y¤(n;C¤) < h and uy(h;y;q;t) < 0 imply u(h;h; ^ q;^ t ¡ ²) > u(h;y¤(n;C¤); ^ q;^ t) for small ².
An agent who alone accepts ~ c determines the average type attracted by ~ n. Rejecting ~ n thus
cannot be optimal for type h. Second, suppose ~ c attracts type h. In both cases principal ~ n
then gets strictly positive utility from entering the market because vt < 0, vy(h;y; ^ q;^ t) ¸ 0,
and y¤(n;C¤) < h imply v(h;h; ^ q;^ t ¡ ²) > v(h;y¤(n;C¤); ^ q;^ t) ¸ 0. Q.E.D.
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